THE NEW REPUBLIC

Disarmament

Is Khrushchev's Proposal "Unthinkable"?

Keith Kyle

Charles Burton Marshall **Secretary of State**

Gerald W. Johnson **Happy New Year, Jack**

Paul H. Douglas **A Southern Editor**

John McKelway **Look! Look!**

January 2, 1961, 25 ¢

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T.R.B. from Washington

Ike's Last Stand

★ Congress meets next Tuesday (January 3) and it's going to be a bit confusing. A lame-duck President is going to start sending messages to a newly elected Congress whose political leader (Mr. Kennedy) won't be sworn in till January 20. It will be Eisenhower's last say – in triplicate. He is required to send up a budget message, a report on the economy and a state of the union message which will be his swan song. We won't hear officially from Kennedy till he reads his Inaugural Address from the marble steps before the new Capitol façade. Grandstand seats for this festival rite are already being nailed together. (If you come bring blankets: it normally rains or snows on this auspicious occasion.)

Eisenhower's farewell will presumably evoke a mood of affection from admirers. America's economy is in bad shape but he will be hopeful; the budget is in precarious balance but he will ask a surplus; neither the state of the union nor of the world is anything to brag about but one can bet he will take a rosy view.

In fairness to Eisenhower he has modified his opinion of Kennedy, whom he referred to sarcastically as the "genius" in the campaign. Eisenhower never fully understood what Kennedy was driving at but when he met him face to face in their two-hour confrontation at the White House he found a personable young man who asked intelligent questions and was both dignified and deferential. Not the president of a big corporation, you understand, but after all – the fellow did see action in the Pacific. . . . Eisenhower held his last press conference way back on September 7, and does not seem to have been bowed down by executive burdens since.

What Kennedy Wants

★ From this mellow prospect we turn to a more sober one, young Mr. Kennedy and the American people. What is he trying to do? – how can he do it? Kennedy is tough and self-confident but he has just been elected by one of the smallest margins in history. Every minority group can claim it elected him and all their IOU's together would bankrupt him. In Congress his party has a big majority, on paper, but he is like a young king surrounded by feudal lords. Will a hostile coalition form? Will his own spokesmen support him? In the election he ran behind his party and it will take all his skill to keep control after the first enthusiasm and patronage give out.

And what is it Kennedy wants? If this reporter is a judge he wants to wake the American people to its peril and possibilities, to shake it out of its drugged dream, to make it face gritty realities and probably a tougher life. Has the country awakened? Not by the looks of that spy-fleck majority! Every other voter he meets voted against him. He is in office but he has no Rooseveltian majority clamoring for action. The public does, it would seem, want that modicum of social legislation advanced in Congress last summer: medical care, housing, schools, minimum wage and aid for depressed areas. But beyond that it is doubtful whether the voters feel very strongly; on the still bigger issues they are waiting to hear what Kennedy has to say but they are not committed.

(Even here, it should be noted, Speaker Rayburn draws the line against Federal aid for teachers' salaries – something Kennedy campaigned for up and down the land – and Senate leader Mansfield opposes a quick attack on the filibuster though the Democratic platform specifically urges "action to be taken at the beginning of the 87th Congress.")

Creating Consent

★ It is a matter of simple realism to face this situation and try to figure out the answers. What Kennedy obviously seeks is to build up popular support for himself so that he will have strength when the inevitable showdown comes. His Cabinet is well-received. It has carried reassurance to many. This young man does not seem to be a wild hot-head after all. Even Eisenhower feels better. In making his brother Attorney-General Kennedy has, it is true, given a handle to his enemies; you may be sure it will be seized in days to come. But even here there is something attractive in the step; at least the man who took it has courage and decision.

Kennedy is also reaching the public through his remarkable front porch press conferences – one or two a week – where he is extremely sure-footed. What strikes this onlooker is the way he keeps his dignity. He unbends without going too far; he smiles but keeps men at a distance. It is the mark of the patrician, perhaps; it is displayed under Florida palms and at the frosty-breathed conferences in Georgetown.

Congressional Rules

★ Kennedy told a conference that the Senate must decide its own rules but personally he feels a majority should be able to shut off debate. Two years ago he voted with the liberals seeking such change, who were defeated 67-28. Now the battle comes again in the first hours of the new session. Democrats Hart, Clark and Douglas, Republicans Javits and Case, lead the fight. Frankly, the chances look pretty poor.

"Cloture can wait – bring it up later!" says majority leader Mansfield. The fact is it can't come up successfully later, it must come at the start of a new session and then only under a presiding officer willing to rule that the Senate can reorganize itself every two years. Vice President Nixon has said he would so rule. Vice President-elect Johnson would not (he argues that the Senate is a "continuing body"). If cloture isn't approved now it will probably have to wait eight years till somebody replaces Johnson. Nixon – the liberals' hope. . . . How ironic!

Before it quit the UN passed an anti-colonial resolution, 89 to 0, backed by 43 Afro-Asian nations. Nine embarrassed countries sat silent, including the once-vocal "leader of the Free World" – the United States. It will be good to have Adlai in there.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 144 Number 1 Issue 2408 January 2, 1961*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 25c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address* *Copyright© 1960, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.* *Item g. Second class Imprint, reading Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C.*

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In a number of ways, the year that is ending may be said to be the year during which the US attained its minority. By the beginning of 1960, the balance of population in the Western Hemisphere had shifted from North to Latin America: Those who live below our border numbered 201 million compared with 197 million in the US and Canada. By year's end, 18 new nations had established a new balance in the United Nations between the economically advanced and economically backward countries, introducing the probability that Mr. Hammarskjold's successor will be drawn from the latter. The dizzying speed with which more people are arriving in the newly developing areas will, on the basis of present trends, double the world's population of almost three billion within 40 years, a fact that should be written on the walls of every policy-planning room where officials of the new Administration sit.

Well over half of the world's population – 3.9 billion people – will be in Asia by the year 2000. Less than 10 percent – some 312 million – will be in Northern America. In practical terms, this means that even the most resolutely optimistic study of population figures and trends imposes a highly pessimistic judgment: All the talk about rising standards of living in the underdeveloped countries where economic expectations are so high is belied – utterly and flatly belied – by simple arithmetic. If one divides what is produced in these areas by the increased numbers which, on present form, they will have to support in five, ten, 25 or 40 years hence, the dividend is a decline of their living standards.

The corresponding speed with which the retarded nations must run if they are even to stay where they now are economically was demonstrated by Paul Hoffman, former head of ECA and now director of the UN Special Fund, early in 1960 when he said that if the goal of the 1960's is to double the annual rate of per capita economic growth in 100 countries and territories containing 1.25 billion people, "it will be necessary for the less developed countries to sustain an annual rate of economic growth of four percent. This will mean a total increase of about 40 percent and a per capita increase of nearly 25 percent in ten years." He added the warning that if these billion-and-a-quarter people "do not experience, in that decade, some tangible proof of economic growth, they may well suffer a catastrophic disillusionment with the democratic precepts and economic freedoms they are now trying

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to uphold." Most of the new population now being added to mid-century totals will make no positive contribution to the economy for years to come; on the contrary, they will be sucking up resources produced by the smaller generation that is of working age today. In Ceylon, more than eight percent of the male population has not yet reached its fifth birthday; in Mexico, the ratio is only slightly less. Food, shelter, clothing, education and training for the newcomers must come out of a national production which currently provides per capita incomes of $50 to $200 a year. In Egypt, a million more acres of farm land are expected to be brought into production by the time the Aswan dam is in operation; but by that date, Egypt's population will have risen by some six to seven million.

Not only are more people being born; fewer are dying. Deaths of babies under one year of age do hold down the rate of population growth at present, and in many underdeveloped areas, deaths of those who fail to reach their first birthday constitute more than half of all deaths. In Africa, as a whole, about 230 of every 1,000 live births turn into deaths before a year is over, compared with a figure of 26.4 per 1,000 in the US. But improvements in public health are changing this pattern, and as the general death rate around the world drops, the only available means of controlling the population explosion is by limiting the birth rate. A certain number of progressive countries have, therefore, made the lowering of the birth rate a matter of public policy, though few of the programs have so far produced any very striking results. Some of the more successful methods used – sterilization and abortion – are stark; contraception by the methods familiar in the west would be an exorbitant luxury.

In July, 1959 the recommendations of the Draper Committee's report on the US economic aid program were made public, including its proposal that the US "assist those countries with which it is cooperating in economic aid programs, on request, in the formulation of their plans designed to deal with the problem of rapid population growth." Two months later, a Stanford Research Institute report on the problem of expanding populations was released by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On November 28, a State Department intelligence report, made in July, was quoted as saying that "rapid population growth may prove to be one of the great obstacles to economic and social progress and the maintenance of political stability in many of the less developed areas of the world."

Clearly, in aiding programs of a country that has made its own decision in respect to population limitation, the US would be responding to a local request and not imposing a policy. But it is not yet clear whether our government would so respond, or whether it will decline for fear of offending powerful domestic forces, in particular the Roman Catholic Church.

On October 7, 1959, *The Ecumenical Review*, quarterly journal of the World Council of Churches, composed of Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox bodies, published a report of a study group called at the joint request of the International Missionary Council and the World Council of Churches. The group had accepted the thesis that the limitation or spacing of children is morally permissible, and that "there appears to be no moral distinction between the means now known or practiced, by the use whether of estimated periods of infertility or of artificial barriers to the meeting of sperm and ovum – or indeed of drugs which would, if made effective and safe, inhibit or control ovulation in a calculable way."

But on November 25, the Catholic bishops of the US declared their disapproval of "any public assistance either at home or abroad to promote artificial birth prevention . . . whether by direct aid or means of international organization." Within a few days, after the Right Reverend James A. Pike, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of San Francisco, had asked whether the bishops' statement was binding on Catholic candidates for public office, the following statements were made:

Senator Kennedy: "I would not think it wise for the United States to refuse to grant assistance to a country which is pursuing a policy it feels to be in its best interest. . . . I would base my determination as to whether I should approve such a law on my personal judgment as President as to what would be in the interest of the United States. If it became a law of the land, I would uphold it as the law of the land."

Senator Humphrey: "The issue of artificial birth control is not before the Congress. Nor is it one on which our Government should set policy for other nations and peoples. Nor should any policy be adopted to deny information and assistance if any nation determines that it is essential to its national welfare."

Adlai E. Stevenson: "The United States should not impose birth-control programs on foreign countries. But the United States should not hesitate to consider requests for aid to birth-control programs in foreign countries where population growth is inimicable to economic well-being."

Governor Williams: "If the people of a country request technical assistance from the United States in an area where it had knowledge, it would seem to me that the United States would want to cooperate with them if it was in the interests of the other country."

At the same time, however, a spokesman for the International Cooperation Administration declared that "not one penny of foreign aid funds ever has been used for dissemination of birth-control information and there are no plans to do so." And at his December 2 press conference, President Eisenhower said: "I cannot

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imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility."

Yet, emphatically, others see the matter quite differently. In November, 1960, the birth-control issue suddenly burst into flames during the campaign for reelection of Muñoz-Marín as Governor of Puerto Rico. In the face of direct political intervention by the Catholic bishops of the island, whose warning that it was a sin for church members to vote for a candidate who had advocated birth-control was read from all Catholic pulpits on the Sunday before the vote, the Governor was handsomely reelected.

And in California, *The San Francisco Chronicle* in December polled its readers on population problems and found that 85 percent believe it is proper for the US government to concern itself with limiting the birth rate, and 65 percent said specifically they would approve the government's providing the money to pay for birth control programs overseas. Ten years ago, no newspaper would have dared poll its readers on this subject; and if one had, it is a fair guess that the results would not have been the same.

Finally, India's Ambassador to the United States, M. C. Chagla in a speech in Dallas, Texas, last May, gave this view of the requirements of the present situation:

"In my own country, the population is about 400 millions, and the population is increasing at the rate of eight million a year. . . . If modern civilization has come to India in the shape of better medicine, better surgery, better knowledge about the after-care of children, civilization cannot be permitted to stop here. . . .

"Now we are one of the few countries in the world which has officially at Government level adopted the policy of birth control and family planning. We are very fortunate that there has not been much serious religious objection in India. . . . We have earmarked a sum of about $200 million in our Third Five-Year Plan. What we want to achieve is to cut down our present birth rate by at least half . . . what we really need in India today is a cheap oral contraceptive. It should be so cheap that it would be possible to sell these pills as widely as quinine or aspirin is sold in India today. . . .

"I say to you with all the emphasis that I can command that on a question like this, a great country like the United States cannot afford to be neutral. . . ."

YEAR'S END: *The Editors of The New Republic wish to thank friends and readers who made possible during 1960 a 76.2 percent increase in circulation and an 85 percent increase in advertising over 1959.*

Beat, Beat, Beat

"The modern machine," E. B. White has observed, "is rapidly acquiring man's characteristics." The newest machine to come to our attention has acquired woman's. Its name (*Securitone*) is as friendly as its appearance: it is a small ($7\frac{1}{4}$" wide, $4\frac{3}{4}$" deep, $3\frac{1}{4}$" high), white plastic box. In contrast to the children for whom it is intended, *Securitone* should be heard and not seen; this device, meant to be placed next to the crib to give Baby the feeling that Mother is near, reproduces with scientific exactitude the sound of Mother's heartbeat. It is the invention of Dr. Lee Salk, brother of Dr. Jonas Salk.

In observing the behavior of a mother rhesus monkey and her newborn, Dr. Salk became aware that mother monkey showed a marked tendency to hold the newborn on her left side, frequently with his ear pressed against her heart. To determine whether human mothers had similar tendencies, he observed 287 of them. 80 percent – right and left-handed ones – did.

Observations led to questions, experiments, further observations. Mightn't this tendency on the part of the mother be an instinctive response evolved from a need on the part of the infant to experience a continuation of the familiar maternal heartbeat rhythm? Wouldn't exposure to this sound buffer the trauma of birth by providing the infant with the continuity of a stimulus to which it had been exposed prior to birth?

These expectations were tested. Briefly: a tape recording of mothers' heartbeats was played for four days, through loudspeakers, into a nursery containing 102 newborn infants. (A control group of 112 babies heard the nursery's usual noises, but no heartbeats.) There was no significant difference in food intake between the two groups, but 69.9 percent of the infants exposed to the heartbeats gained weight; only 33.3 percent of the control group did. The heartbeat babies also cried significantly less, breathed more regularly and deeply, were less restless, and showed a tendency to less respiratory and gastrointestinal upset.

"Experts" regard the experiment as indicating that the child who has a *Securitone* in his nursery has a better than average chance to grow into a mentally

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healthy adult. There are also indications that this machine will work well with older children who have difficulty going to sleep, and with adult insomniacs too.

Although *Securitone* is not yet on the market (the Sonotone Corporation will make it available for "under $30" early in the new year), we already have Dr. Salk's assurance that Baby will not become addicted to the machine and need it to get to sleep for the rest of his life, "because," as Dr. Salk told a reporter, "in a normal situation the mother's love soon removes the necessity for the biological reassurance of the heartbeat." If the child did become an addict, this would indicate a radical wrong in the mother-child relationship, in which case Dr. Salk says the child "is better off with the *Securitone* machine than without it." If for any reason – illness, divorce or death – the child was separated from his mother there might be a great reliance upon *Securitone*, and in this event Dr. Salk says, "As a baby is weaned from a bottle to a cup, the young child could be eventually weaned from the *Securitone* rhythm to music." That same reporter went on to conclude that "*Securitone* holds out a hope that America can raise her next generation of children with stronger bodies and healthier personalities, based solidly on the great natural foundation of maternal love."

Worth at least $30, except to those who ride in cars and wonder what became of horses, or who forgot to take dinner out of the deep freeze and go hungry.

Another Chance in Laos?

The changes are rung so fast in Laos these days that it would be extremely premature to believe that the tide has changed against the Communist Pathet Lao and their backers in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow. The Russions, the Chinese and the Pathet Lao continue to recognize Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister; and since the Russians were flying weapons into Vientiane after his flight to Cambodia, it is improbable that they will be deterred by fine points in constitutional law from diverting their supplies to the airfield at Sam Neua, which is in Communist Pathet Lao hands. The United States, meanwhile, is resuming military shipments to the pro-Western government, now headed by Prince Boun Oum.

Another continuing element of doubt, and a valid reason for caution in assessing the chances of the right-wing government which now appears to be more or less in control in Laos, is the loyalty of the bulk of the Royal Army. At the 1958 supplementary election, which was designed to broaden the base of government by giving the electors an opportunity to vote for the political wing of the Pathet Lao, the Army's votes were counted separately. To the Royalists' dismay they found that approximately half the votes went to the Communists. To those in the know, therefore, the paratroop *coup d'etat* led by neutralist Captain Kong Lae, which resulted progressively in the installation of Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister, the promise of coalition government with the Communists and a three-way civil war, was no surprise.

That General Phoumi Nosavan, who is backed by the West, succeeded in marching up river from Savannakhet without falling prey to the large-scale ambushes in which all Maoist-oriented guerrillas delight, suggests, however, that the Pathet Lao were either badly prepared or have less control of the countryside than is often feared. In any event, their failure has provided the anti-Communist forces with another chance. Even that did not seem remotely possible at the beginning of the month when the Pathet Lao, with the aid of Captain Kong Lae's paratroopers, were preparing for the take-over. The United States for a time seemed to be prepared to make a stand in the cause of the militant anti-Communists; but its three principal Western allies in SEATO, Britain, France and Australia, pinning their hopes on "non-Communism," would not go along.

In this controversy, SEATO has been a major casualty. It was set up after the Geneva Agreement in 1954 had brought the Indo-China war to an end. It was intended solely to prevent the spread of Communism through Southeast Asia and to that end threw what Secretary Dulles called a "mantle of protection" over Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. What we have seen in Laos in recent years – and are also seeing in South Vietnam – is the Communist response to this SEATO challenge. During 1957, for instance, when Prince Souphanouvong participated in a coalition government, the Pathet Lao used the opportunity to extend their influence throughout the country, building up a network of organizations in the remote villages and using terrorist methods where persuasion failed. According to an official British report, "Their organization was both horizontal and vertical, on the orthodox pattern, comprising cells, family groups, and front organizations for women, youth farmers, etc." The report described this series of interlocking organizations as "resembling a spider's web with the Lao Dong Party (the Communist Party of North Vietnam) at the center," providing the Laotian satellite party with an intelligence network and material aid.

Against this type of Communist operation, SEATO had neither the know-how nor the means to cope. And in Bangkok on December 12, SEATO's Secretary-General expressed what may well become the organization's epitaph. "While Laos is protected by SEATO against aggression this does not mean that the organization is designed to prevent States from going Communist," he said.

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1960 As It Looked To MAULDIN & HERBLOCK

"Anything Rubbing Off?"

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

"Tell Me, as One Old Soldier To Another, How Does It Feel Actually To Run a Government?"

"Sometimes I Feel Like Running Away, Too, But I Don't Know Where To Go"

"Sir! What Are You Doing In My Boudoir?"

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Big Mama



Five Weeks To Go



"That's Show Biz"

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Happy New Year, Jack

Knowing darn well that he isn't going to get it, we all join heartily in wishing the Hon. John F. Kennedy a Happy New Year, for such is the custom at this season; and Mr. Kennedy doubtless will return thanks politely for the wish although it is the belief, and the earnest hope of this superficial observer that a happy New Year is the last thing he desires.

The word "last" is used literally. Every rational man desires a happy year, but if Mr. Kennedy puts it last on the list of his wishes the rest of us may well rejoice, for dismal experience has shown us that a happy President is all too likely to preside over a woebegone country. The two happiest Presidents of recent years undoubtedly were Coolidge and Eisenhower. We know what Coolidge brought us to; and what Eisenhower may have brought us to is no fit subject of speculation on a festive occasion.

What all of us wish for Mr. Kennedy is a year that will not be catastrophic; and 49.7 percent of us wish him one that will be reasonably successful. So, at least, we indicated by our votes. This is within the bounds of the possible and if it is attained the last day of 1961 will certainly find Mr. Kennedy happy enough; so perhaps the traditional greeting is not altogether sardonic.

The critical nature of the coming year is only too glaringly evident. Few will be informed and none edified by reiteration of malaises it is sure to bring. Less obvious, but nevertheless real, are certain chances that Fortune, with some assistance from the gentleman himself, may favor Mr. Kennedy.

For instance, there is reasonable hope that Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson on the 21st day of the month will not find himself in the army of the unemployed. On that date he is supposed to report to the United Nations, if any. The thing has been falling apart with horrible speed in recent weeks, but it will probably last for another month, which would give Adlai time to be sworn in.

The crumbling of the world organization is an appalling thing, but that very fact may work to Mr. Kennedy's advantage. The jolt that it has administered to the typical American ought to wake him up and make him willing to support any intelligent effort to save the situation, even to the extent of lending aid and comfort to a Democratic President. By the same token the fact that by Thanksgiving Day, 1960, instead of by Washington's birthday the recession had forced itself into recognition even by the one-party press is a bit of luck. It is now a matter of common knowledge that it was already present last June, so it belongs to the Eisenhower Administration and Kennedy's is the salvage, not the wrecking crew.

Even the bawling Castro may eventually prove to be more of an asset than a net loss to the new Administration. The very extravagance of the Cuban's charges is proof that we had somehow failed to make our basic good-will plain to the Latin Americans, which means that our foreign service has not done its job intelligently. Hence Mr. Kennedy may reasonably hope for strong support if he drives a bull-dozer right through that service.

Finally, the Dixiecrats have at last worked themselves into such a position that the separation of the sheep from the goats below the Potomac is no longer a problem. With Hodges, of North Carolina, in the Cabinet and Rusk, born in Georgia, heading it, nobody can accuse Kennedy of refusing recognition to the genuine Democrats of the South; so if he heaves out the men who tried to knife him, he will be bestowing its just reward upon what Cleveland called "party perfidy and party dishonor."

True, none of these things can be turned to advantage by "Nods and Becks and wreathed smiles." It will be rough going for awhile and the air of Washington will probably be filled with dust and feathers rather than with sunshine and sweet music. But think of the possible gain! If the tottering United Nations can be propped up the tide of the Cold War will turn again in our favor. If the ailing economy can be treated with brains rather than with pious hopes and quotations from Adam Smith, the gold will begin to flow back. If the baleful influence of McCarthyism can be eliminated from the foreign service, the Western world will see us in a new light. If none but Democrats are admitted to party councils, treachery will become unprofitable.

All this with a little bit of luck might come to pass. If it does, by next December Kennedy, even though covered with lumps and minus a good bit of skin, may reasonably affirm that his was a happy New Year.

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DISARMAMENT

Is Khrushchev's Proposal "Unthinkable"?

by Keith Kyle

"It is unthinkable," writes the distinguished diplomatic historian, Professor William L. Langer, in his specialist contribution to the report of the President's Commission on National Goals, "that anything approaching complete disarmament can be achieved in the foreseeable future." "To be sure," Mr. Langer goes on, "the Soviets have proposed the speedy abolition of all armaments, but this proposal is so patently illogical and impracticable as to stamp it a cynical propaganda fraud."

My purpose is to provoke thought about "the unthinkable." It is only too clear from the paragraph on disarmament in the briefer, general report on "Goals for Americans" what not thinking about it leads to. It leads to a paragraph like this (and this is supposed to be about *goals*, not shifts and expedients): "Since a *major* nuclear war would be a world *catastrophe*, the limitation and control of nuclear armament is *imperative*. Disarmament should be our *ultimate* goal. It cannot be attained without *eliminating* the sources of distrust and fear among nations. Hence, our immediate task must be the step-by-step advance *toward control of nuclear weapons* and their means of delivery, with effective international inspection." [My italics.] We are so accustomed to reading this sort of stuff that it may need a second glance to bring home the fact that this is a counsel of sheer despair.

The first sentence sounds urgent enough, although closer inspection reveals a slackening of thought even at the outset. Why should only a *major* nuclear war constitute a world catastrophe? (And, come to think of it, what is a *minor* nuclear war anyway? Already has crept in the idea, of which Herman Kahn is the principal expositor, that we can have a nuclear war on the side and get away with it.) And why, for that matter, a major *nuclear* war? A major war of any sort is likely to escalate into a nuclear war, even if nuclear weapons have been abolished (since the guilty knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons cannot be unlearned). Still, we at least have the vocabulary of urgency. Action we are told is *imperative*. But action not over disarmament but over "the limitation and control of nuclear armament." And lest this should be thought to be a quibble, since "limitation of armament" might amount to the same thing as partial disarmament, note that three sentences later the limitation which is so imperative to stop world catastrophe had got lost, and the immediate task is said to be "the step-by-step advance toward control of nuclear weapons. . . ." What is imperative no longer needs to be immediate. And just to confirm the gloomiest interpretation of the Commission's words, it postpones disarmament to an "ultimate" future in which "the sources of distrust and fear among nations" shall have been "eliminated." This is no modest requirement. The sources of such distrust and fear are rather less likely ever to cease between nations than they are to cease between individuals. The ultimate therefore is the infinite.

This throwing in of the sponge simply cannot be allowed to become by repetition and default the consensus of the West without challenge and debate. On top of all the familiar and perfectly valid arguments against the spread of nuclear knowledge to "nth powers" and about the mounting perils of split-second miscalculation in triggering off a nuclear exchange comes the clear indication from this year's session of the UN General Assembly that a powerful economic motive is pulling in the "proletarian nations" of Latin America as well as of Asia and Africa behind the Soviet slogan of "general and complete disarmament." These countries are by now acutely aware that the scale of foreign aid that is likely to come from advanced industrial countries which are at the same time engaged in a nuclear arms race is not even sufficient to counteract the fall in the prices of primary products. They see one chance and one alone of making the quantum leap into industrial affluence – the switching of a substantial proportion of the money lavished on armaments to the task of evening up the distribution of the world's wealth. They will be looking especially for a new lead from the US in this new year, since the Democrats have been elected on a platform which calls attention to the fact that "more than $100 billion of the world's production now goes each year into armaments," and promises that "as worldwide disarmament proceeds, it will free vast resources for a new

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"He Started a Preventive War and I'm Fightin' To End War."

international attack on the problem of world poverty."

If it were indeed the case that a balance of forces at the highest attainable level of terror is now the only remaining way of preserving civilized life on the globe, then it would be our duty to turn a hard face on the poor and tell them that it is every bit as much in their own interests as it is in ours that nothing but crumbs should ever be left over for them from the tables of the rich. But this is not what we in the West are doing at all. We are endorsing – as the US and Britain did last year by voting for the resolution which set up the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament – the goal of "general and complete disarmament" which in the circumstances amounts to a promissory note to the poor.

Are we serious about honoring that note? Do we in truth want "general and complete disarmament"? The standard answer is: "Yes we do want it, provided it is accompanied by a cheatproof system of international control and verification." We usually go on with the plausibly empirical argument that mutual confidence can only be built up piece by piece, that the agreed goal of total disarmament is best approached by easy stages at each of which long and if necessary indefinite rests can be taken, and that each one of these stages must be so devised and controlled, especially at the outset, that the elements of reliance on the other side's good faith is completely eliminated. We attribute lack of progress in the face of so much reasonableness on our part to obtuse or sinister insistence by the Russians on nothing but their own plan, which is habitually summarized in the American press as providing for "disarmament without control."

Now, if the United States and her allies are not proposing to follow the logic of the Goals Commission and throw up their hands on disarmament altogether this bundle of attitudes is not good enough. In the first place it is simply not the case that the Russians are proposing disarmament without control, as anyone who studies the text of the successive Russian drafts, the exchanges in the Ten-Nation group in Geneva, especially those between M. Moch and Mr. Zorin on June 14, and the recent speeches of Mr. Khrushchev can quite plainly see. And in the second place, the whole cycle of disarmament negotiations to date has demonstrated, largely as a result of data submitted by the scientists of the West, that cheatproof control is simply not to be had. Therefore those who say they are in favor of complete disarmament with cheatproof control are saying that they are against complete disarmament – and this remains true however many intermediate stages are interposed between the present and the ultimate goal.

Two conclusions could be drawn from the experience of the negotiations so far. One is that at no point can the element of trust in the good faith of the other side be altogether eliminated. The other is that, contrary to the usual analogy of learning to walk before learning to run, small stages are not any easier to negotiate and may well be harder to negotiate than large stages. This is the case for two reasons. The first is that if a single stage is looked at on its own without any necessary relationship to subsequent stages the difficulty of balancing incommensurable factors of offensive and defensive armament involving nations very differently situated may well be insurmountable. This difficulty has wrecked every disarmament conference in the world's history to date. The second point about small stages is that unfortunately in present conditions of nuclear technology a modest amount of disarmament requires a disproportionately large degree of inspection. To take a couple of figures out of the air simply by way of rough-and-ready illustration, one-tenth of total disarmament might require two-thirds of ultimate control.

The Coming of the Rockets

But what is wrong, it may be asked, with having at the outset more control than disarmament? Well, much depends of course on whether the balance is going automatically to right itself, if, to revert to the previous crude demonstration, one can count from the outset on

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the remaining nine-tenths of disarmament following along with the remaining one-third of control. But this is not the Western proposition. Indeed many Americans – the Goals Commission, for example, though not the official American negotiators – go further. They argue that *controlled disarmament* is not really feasible at all, outside perhaps a policed test ban. But, they add, *control over armaments* for its own sake would have many positive merits. In particular it would "open up" Russia to inspection, thus providing a safeguard against surprise attack or at least against the pathological fear of a surprise attack.

While the Communists make unnecessarily sharp and epigrammatic their antithesis between control over armaments, which they sharply reject, and control over disarmament, which they claim to embrace, their case against innovations of the "anti-surprise attack" type deserves respectful attention. They maintain that whatever may at one time have been the merits of such proposals, they have been rendered archaic by the coming of the intercontinental rockets. Supposing, for example, Western inspectors discovered that the Russians were more advanced than had been thought in some revolutionary weapon which in a few months would give them a decisive superiority. Would not the mere presence of inspectors, able to convey this scarifying news and able in addition to pinpoint the precise location of prime Russian targets, increase rather than diminish the danger of war? Would they not accompany panicking warnings with tempting information that would make a pre-emptive strike feasible? It is my belief that the West, even in such circumstances, would not strike first. But can one ask the Russians to feel certain of that? Again, it could be argued that this cuts both ways since the Russians are simultaneously inspecting America. But the Russians now think of themselves as always being technologically in the lead, and their military writers make no bones about the superior security maintained in Russia being one of her characteristic advantages.

Supposing, furthermore, that inspectors saw evidence that seemed on the surface to indicate a Russian intention to launch a surprise attack. The evidence would almost certainly be ambiguous and would, since a nuclear war is essentially fought by forces in being, leave little time for further examination. Assuming communications were still open between the inspectors and the NATO area, the utmost warning that could be given to the United States would be half an hour before the missiles arrived, if they were indeed about to be fired. If the alarm were a false one, as such an unverified observation might well be, the mere sending of it could cause a war by miscalculation. The Americans might launch "massive retaliation" or the Russians, on intercepting the warning, might conclude that this is what the Americans could be expected to do and anticipate this reaction by making the warning come true. Even if the buttons were never actually pressed the presence of inspectors while both sides were still actively engaged in an all-out arms race might well, on balance, generate extra tension.

What Has Mr. K Proposed?

Nothing resembling "mere" arms control is likely to be acceptable to the Russians. Let us, therefore, look dispassionately at what the Soviets do find acceptable. It has gone through several versions, notably those of September 18, 1959, June 2, 1960, and September 23, 1960 – which in itself bespeaks a certain readiness to be flexible. But the one feature that all have had in common has been the requirement of a single treaty to cover all aspects of disarmament. It is this on which the Russians insist; it is this which the West rejects; and it is over this that the present deadlock exists.

The most important question I want to raise for discussion is simply this: Are we really sure that we are right in making such a point of rejecting the technique of a single treaty out of hand? There are some obvious disadvantages in trying to put everything into a single treaty. The negotiation of such a catch-all code, which will be laying the ground rules for a totally new departure in international relations, will be an extremely arduous undertaking. It will occupy time which those who stick to the step-by-step approach feel could be more profitably used in gaining experience with an experimental first stage. But this is a circular argument, since if there is no general understanding that we shall proceed by small stages which are complete in themselves, the negotiation of a first stage will take up an unprofitable amount of time also. The single-treaty approach ought not to be spurned either because it is difficult or because it is proposed by the Russians. It should be refused only if the West or the world in general would be asked to run risks that exceed the risks which the Russians, too, would be running, as well as the risks which both East and West are running.

The disarmament treaty which Khrushchev proposes has three main characteristics: it encompasses all phases of disarmament up to and including total armlessness except for internal security forces at agreed levels; it provides for a tight time schedule (the Russians now say that the four years of Mr. K's original proposal need only be treated as illustrative); and it stipulates for a first stage – taking up only a year or a year and a half – which should represent very substantial progress toward the final objective. The first point to note about this formula is its striking similarity to that employed by the initiators of supranationality in Europe. After all, the Coal and Steel Community and the succeeding steps

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culminating in the European Common Market represent the most successful innovation in international relations of recent years. They were launched by the French and the Germans in an abrupt departure from conventional diplomatic behavior that was intended to signalize their exceptional character. Potential members of the Coal and Steel Community, for example, were asked to sign a waiver of their national sovereignty over these basic industries as the price of admission to the negotiating table. The point was that discussion of the details of the proposals for removing economic barriers within Western Europe would only be profitable if all participants were openly committed to the same revolutionary objective.

A plan to change the course of all human history and bring about a state of affairs in which national armed forces are no longer a factor in international relations is far more radical than a plan to merge France and Germany. The Russians take the position that before they come down to detail they must know which ballgame they are playing in. A specific item of control proposed to them by the West might at one and the same time be perfectly acceptable to the East if it were part of a rapid transitional process that in a measurable period of time would bring the world to a wholly new system of international relationships, and yet be wholly unacceptable and dismissable as espionage if it were related to an isolated step that could well leave large military forces in being confronting each other indefinitely. It is because the two sides are talking at cross purposes that many of the exchanges at disarmament conferences have such an air of unreality. The West keeps calling on the East to get down to cases; the East keeps calling on the West to agree on the context into which these cases are to be placed.

Soviet Thoughts on Control

The reason that is usually given for the Soviet approach on disarmament being unthinkable is that its authors offer no satisfaction on the subject of control. But however valid this criticism may have been once, it no longer is today and it does no service to the Western cause to continue repeating it. Some of the initial confusion over the place of control in the Russians' scheme of things was their fault, because it figured rather vaguely in their earlier drafts and their delegates were initially unprepared to answer the searching enquiries of M. Moch, who is by far the most sophisticated and experienced of the Western negotiators. But in later responses at Geneva and subsequently in Mr. Khrushchev's statements in New York and, since his return, in Moscow, the Russians have gone a long way toward clarifying their stand.

Under the latest Russian plan, circulated with the text of Mr. Khrushchev's opening speech at the UN on September 23, the principles and some of the detail of control would be incorporated in the disarmament treaty. A Control Council, for example, is provided for which will "consist of representatives of socialist countries, of representatives of States now members of Western military and political alliances, and of representatives of neutral states" (presumably in equal number, although the draft does not actually say so and this would be negotiable). Voting in the Council "except where otherwise especially agreed upon" would be by two-thirds majority for matters of substance and simple majority for procedure. If the neutrals, the East and the West would have equal representation, there would therefore be no Soviet veto. The precise details of the control system, says Mr. K, will be worked out by a preparatory commission which will complete its work *between the signature and the ratification of the treaty* (the United States Senate would therefore be able to satisfy itself that a satisfactory control system was in being and ready to hit the ground running before being called upon to apply its imprimatur). A world disarmament conference at which China and other powers would be invited to accede to the treaty and the control arrangements, would also take place during the same interval. The key sentence in the Soviet proposals which makes it plain that control would not take place *after* disarmament but simultaneously with it and that the control system would be ready for action *before* disarmament actually begins reads as follows *[Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament,* UN Doc A/4505. III (d)]: "The control organization will distribute its inspectors over the territory of states in such a way as to enable them to start discharging their functions the moment states initiate the implementation of disarmament measures."

But, it may be asked, is there any prospect of a meeting of minds about the kinds of control which would be enforced by this machinery, even should the Soviet offer of satisfactory machinery turn out to be genuine? Here we come to the curious episode of Khrushchev's heckling of Prime Minister Macmillan during the UN debate. Fortunately for Mr. Macmillan, Khrushchev spoke in Russian, and since Russian is not widely understood outside Slav countries, his interjection was not caught by the simultaneous interpreters. Macmillan was therefore able to score a point by his neat parliamentary deflection of his august heckler. But this depended for its effect entirely on the fact that Khrushchev's words could not be understood. What he actually did was to cut short Macmillan's elaborate spelling out, for the benefit of new delegates, of the absolute necessity for control by offering a deal: "You accept our approach on disarma-

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ment; we will accept your ideas of control." That this was not just an off-the-cuff remark has since been repeatedly confirmed, most recently in an interview of Mr. Khrushchev by *Pravda*, the text of which has been formally registered by the Russians as a UN document.

If the only obstacle to whole-hog disarmament, therefore, is skepticism about Russian willingness to admit adequate control, the way is open for a controlled experiment. The West could accept Khrushchev's bargain, a treaty could be negotiated and before the American Senate would be required to pronounce upon it experience in the work of the preparatory commission would enable the West to tell whether the Russians were keeping their word in letting us write our own ticket on control.

Two Important Obstacles

I am not here proposing to go into detail about the stages of disarmament contained in the Russian proposals, since I believe these to be negotiable once the general concept has been agreed upon. I must however, acknowledge what seems to me to be the two most serious obstacles to the type of diplomatic breakthrough I have been considering. These obstacles are much more to the point than most of the arguments which are being bandied around, and there should be far more concentration upon them if we are serious about doing something to end the dangers in the present balance of terror. The first is that the West does not have confidence in its own system of control. The second is that it does not automatically follow that a world without armaments will be more stable than a world with them.

The real issue over control is not one of Western against Eastern forms of inspection and certainly not one of Western advocacy of control against Eastern rejection of it. It is the infancy of the science of arms control itself. There is no need for the West to be ashamed of these gaps in its own ideas. No one has been working on nuclear arms control for very long and Western scientists have contributed most of the knowledge that there is. Indeed the Russian notions of control have become progressively more sophisticated largely as the result of their experience of negotiating with the West. The West has managed to convey the need for joint studies before a proper control system can be developed that will command general confidence. The latest Soviet plan goes along with this to the extent of incorporating joint studies into its time schedule, although this does not produce a very consistent result since it is a highly unscientific proceeding to stipulate that scientific experiments shall be successful within a given, rather short time limit.

What is lacking is any sense in the West of burning zeal to develop control proposals that will satisfy the West's own standards. Of course there are individuals who are devoting their time and talent to this cause. But the devastating account given in the National Planning Association's recent pamphlet on "Strengthening the Government for Arms Control" (NPA Planning Pamphlet No. 109, July, 1960) of the amateurish last minute fashion in which the American position is assembled in advance of each round of disarmament negotiations shows the urgent need to give research into the implementation of disarmament the same order of priority as is given to the further amassment and refinement of armaments.

Only if we know our own minds about disarmament and really mean to bring it about once the scientific difficulties can be rendered tractable will we be morally entitled to conduct the dialogue with the neutrals which ought now to be taking place. The neutrals reproach both sides in the Cold War for endangering human survival and for wasting in unproductive armaments the wherewithal to even out the maldistribution of the world's wealth. We ought to place ourselves in the position in which we can ask them: "What are you, in your turn, proposing to do to convince us that you are going to conduct yourselves peacefully in a world without power in the hands of Great Powers?" Nehru may be neutral in relation to the Cold War between Washington and Moscow, but he is not neutral in relation to Kashmir; Nasser is a neutralist but not over Palestine; Sukarno not over West Irian; Nkrumah not over Togoland. The physical existence of a balance of terror between the Great Powers acts as something of a deterrent against a resumption of these frozen wars. Will the concealed balance of terror represented by the immortality of scientific knowledge even in an armless world continue to be sufficient to give quarrelsome nations pause? How are we all to be convinced that, dangerous as our present world is, the new world may not be even more dangerous still? The release of a whole mass of historic feuds from the shadow of "the bomb" could well create a volatile, panicky situation that would result in the re-manufacture from some hidden stock of "the bomb" under conditions even less susceptible to rational restraint than the present. It is to the resolution of such doubts and misgivings that "neutral" nations could fairly be invited to make their contribution.

But what real conviction is there among Western governments that if only the major scientific challenges of arms control could be mastered they would welcome a rapid transition to a state of total world disarmament? If there is such conviction, are we conveying it effectively to the world? It is clear from the current proceedings at the UN that we are not.

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

Look! Look! Someone Is in the Garden

Look.

Look. See. Look and see the house. The house is white. It is a white house.

The white house has a garden.

What is in the garden?

There is grass in the garden. The grass is green.

There is something else in the garden.

What is it?

It is a football.

Is the football lost? Who lost the football? Did Jack lose the football?

Yes. See Jack looking for the football. Jack is in the garden by the white house looking for the football.

It is a touch football.

Wait!

Jack sees the football. Jack does not pick up the football. Is Jack looking for the football? No. Jack is looking for something else. What is Jack looking for?

Look.

See Bobby. Here comes Bobby.

See Bobby in the garden with Jack. Jack and Bobby are in the garden.

What are Bobby and Jack doing in the garden?

They are looking for the football.

No. They are not looking for the football. Jack and Bobby are looking for something else.

Wait!

Here comes father.

What is father doing in the garden?

Father, Bobby and Jack are looking in the garden.

Here comes mother. Mother and father, Bobby and Jack, are in the garden looking for something.

Here comes Ted. Here comes Eunice. Here comes Pat. Here comes Peter. Here comes Sargent. Here comes Jackie.

They are all in the garden looking for the mandate.

Who has the mandate?

Where is the mandate?

What color is the mandate?

Is the mandate large or small?

Who had the mandate?

Dwight David had the mandate. He had the mandate for eight years. He got the mandate from Harry. Harry got the mandate from Franklin. Herbert lost the mandate and gave it to Franklin. Calvin had given it to Herbert.

It is hard to keep the mandate. It is hard to get your hands on it.

Dwight David tried to give it to Richard.

Did Richard get the mandate?

Does Richard have the mandate?

Is Richard hiding the mandate that belongs to Jack?

Does the mandate really belong to Jack?

If the mandate belongs to Jack, why doesn't Richard give it to Jack?

Maybe Richard doesn't know he has the mandate.

Does Jack think Richard has the mandate?

Does Richard think Jack has the mandate?

Who has the mandate?

Does Jack need the mandate? If Jack, or father, or mother, or Jackie, or Ted, or Bobby, or Eunice, or Sargent, find the mandate what will they do with it?

Look.

Look and see.

See Baby Caroline. Here comes Baby Caroline.

No one is watching Baby Caroline. They are all looking for the mandate in the garden.

Baby Caroline has two ducks.

Wait!

Baby Caroline has the mandate!

Look. She is feeding the mandate to the ducks.

JOHN MCKELWAY
Washington Evening Star

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The Top Job in the Cabinet

by Charles Burton Marshall

Anticipating a change of Administrations in 1961 Henry Wriston two years ago wisely conceived of a session of the American Assembly to be devoted to the Secretaryship of State. Background essays on its character and requirements were prepared by Dean Acheson, a former occupant of the office, and six others, all closely knowledgeable of it – Paul H. Nitze, Robert R. Bowie, Dr. Wriston himself, William Y. Elliott, John S. Dickey, and Don K. Price. The session, held at Arden House last October, culminated in a letter of advice to the then undisclosed next President, voicing the views of the 70 participants on how he should regard the office and relate himself to the man in it so as to get the highest effectiveness from him. The seven essays and the letter make up a book entitled *The Secretary of State*, published virtually simultaneously with the designation to that office of Dean Rusk, who had helped plan the session from its inception and was active among the participants. This triumph of unrehearsed timing – to be savored someday by historians and biographers – heightens interest in a useful book.

The Secretary of State
Edited by Don K. Price
(Prentice-Hall; $3.50 cloth; $1.95 paper)

The early Jeffersonians expected the United States soon to achieve a solution of all its external problems. That happy view prevailed at the time of the creation of the office by the first Congress. Sensitive to the anomaly of a foreign office and a foreign secretary in a country freed of external concerns, the Congress decided to give the establishment a catch-all name, the Department of State, to title its chief accordingly, and to assign him an array of domestic functions lest he should work himself out of something to do. Even so, the early Secretaries of State had time on their hands. In the first half of our history they often practiced their private professions in off hours. One Secretary within living memory got to work in mid-morning and customarily knocked off for the afternoon.

The component essays do not labor the changes which have made such bygone circumstances now seem like ancient history – for example, the ebb of the imperial order which once encompassed relations between peoples of diverse cultures, the present mushrooming of states, the characteristic disparity between their urge and their capacity to progress into modernity, the tendency of modern organization and communication to focus every frustration and divergence among them as a world issue, the spilling of such issues into a persistent, pervasive competition – the cold war – over the conditions of a new world order, and the way in which modern weaponry provides a built-in brink on which the principal adversaries stand perpetually keyed up. In former times the Secretary's primary role was custodial in relation to the treaty-making function. Now it is managerial, embracing concrete commitments and operations of huge scope, variety, and sensitivity.

The attendant problems engage the attention of a proliferating Department of State. A dozen, or maybe two dozen, other Federal agencies are involved in concerns abroad. Keeping order and consistency among them all is a labor of Sisyphus, responsibility for which falls primarily upon the president. A key consideration in how he handles this responsibility is the relationship between him and his Secretary of State. A new president is likely to carry into office a dream of bringing to the task fresh authority and effectiveness, and can find a diversity of formulas purporting to tell him how to do it. At one extreme lie ideas espoused by those whom Acheson calls "the busy advocates of elaboration" – productive in recent months of several schemes for interposing layers of bureaucracy between the President and the Secretary of State. At another extreme lies an oversimple cliché – much heard lately – about a president's being "his own Secretary of State." A third variant, exemplified sometimes in the past, is that of a president's indifferently letting the Secretary run the show on his own in foreign affairs. A persistent theme of these essays rebuts all of these approaches. The emphasis is on rapport, collaboration, and bonds of confidence.

It is fallacious to regard a recessive Secretary as counterpart to presidential leadership in foreign affairs – as if the two offices were numerator and denominator in a fraction. The proper relationship is that of coefficients, the strength of each enhancing that of the other. The instances in which a president has essayed a strong role to the submergence of his Secretary of State – Woodrow Wilson with Robert Lansing or Bainbridge Colby and the second Roosevelt with Cordell Hull or Edward Stettinius, for example – have not been persuasively successful. The first Roosevelt found the presence of John Hay and then Elihu Root at State an asset rather than an encumbrance to strong presidential performance. Harry Truman found it so with George C. Marshall – it was possible to have a Truman Doctrine and a Marshall Plan in the same season – and then Acheson.

Wise words by Acheson are in point: "One can see at a glance that if these two men are going to do their work properly they have got to spend a lot of time together, much of which may not be pleasant. The problems are frustrating. They are sure to provoke controversy in many quarters. Most of the desirable measures are distasteful. . . . All of the decisions are hard. So the Secretary of State has the makings of an unwelcome visitor. But for the President to delegate the functions of

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understanding and deciding is to delegate his office. The worst of all courses would be for the President to delegate the function of understanding to some super staff-officer and retain the function of deciding, or apparently deciding, for himself."

No Secretary of State will find time on his hands anymore. The allocation of energy and moral capital is an unremitting problem for him. The relationship to his chief must be the first consideration. His effectiveness in all else depends on it. Next comes his leadership of his own department and of the nexus of representation abroad. A third is the marshaling of consistency among the various parts of the government affecting our foreign relations. Perhaps fourth and fifth come his leadership of public opinion and his cultivation of understanding at the Capitol; then sixth his personal participation in foreign negotiations. A precise ordering among the last five is perhaps arbitrary, but the primacy of the first is basic and unconditional. Substitution for the Secretary in his various roles to keep his tasks manageable should proceed upward from the bottom of the list – priorities implicit in the book.

The writers might have given greater need to the potential for rivalry and cross purposes between the Secretary's and the Department's role and that of the delegation to the United Nations. This topic has an integral bearing on a question only briefly referred to in the Nitze essay as that of "the desirability or undesirability of an increase in the autonomous power and prestige of the United Nations." Whether or not this will prove a significant omission remains to be disclosed.

I note among the essays recurrent expressions of dissatisfaction regarding the spilling over of the policy-planning function into operations and the fusion of short range and long range considerations within the Secretary's establishment. The Acheson essay, for example, says plaintively, "the principal effort goes into dealing with the overpowering present, the present, which like the Mississippi in full flood, absorbs the whole energy and thought of those who man the levees," and the Bowie essay refers to criticism of "the Policy Planning Staff . . . for becoming too deeply involved in current actions." Bowie calls the criticism "partly valid" and adds "that the Policy Planning Staff will have no special contribution to make if it becomes unduly bound up in current activities" – which seems to be self-evident.

It all adds up to a niggling point not worth the worry it draws. The distinction between planning and operations is more conceptual than actual; and the short term and the long have this in common – they both begin now. The notion identifying long range planning with future decisions is false. It must deal with the future reaches of what is up for decision. Not what may need to be done later to cope with what may happen later still, but what needs to be done now to affect what is at hand or in prospect must be the focal point in policy. This brings the long range and the short together and fuses future planning into current operations – and if concepts and charts are discrepant with reality, the fault is probably with them rather than with it.

Beyond the Five Senses

by Christopher Jencks

Someday perhaps the history of science will be embellished with an intriguing chapter on parapsychology – the study of clairvoyance, telepathy, precognition, and psychokinesis, under a title like "Parapsychology and the Experimental Method," the author will describe 20th Century efforts to make psychic phenomena part of the scientific canon by meticulously following the rules of scientific method laid down by contemporary philosophers. After summarizing the overwhelming evidence against classical mechanistic theories of perception which these experiments quickly generated, the chapter will no doubt go on to emphasize the parapsychologists' failure to formulate new hypotheses to explain their own findings, and will note this failure as the primary reason for the passionate obstinacy with which conventional psychologists damned psychic research as blasphemously "unscientific." No doubt the author will wind up his discussion by pointing out how "this chapter illustrates once again that, despite the hopes of philosophers, science has never actually been merely a procedural faith in some 'method' or 'approach' to truth, but has consisted of a specific set of substantive hypotheses which, at a given historical moment, seemed to provide the most consistent and comprehensive available explanation of the world around us."

The Vital Sense
by H. G. Heine
(Cassell, London; 30/–)

Significant as this conclusion may perhaps seem to the readers of scientific history, most other people are today more intrigued by the question whether psychic phenomena which cannot be explained by conventional psychology really occur at all. Unfortunately, this question is not easy to answer, for as with psychoanalysis, the incidents which first drew public attention to the remarkable theories in question came not from careful experiments but from individual biographies. Narratives about women who woke their husbands in the middle of the night to describe a dream about their son's death in a typhoon ten thousand miles away make exciting and intriguing reading, but they are difficult to verify and open to a multitude of interpretations. It was not until these tales were supplemented by experimental investigations that they earned the attention of "scientific" psychologists, and even today the whole field is generally regarded as a rather tasteless joke. Nevertheless, experimental parapsychology has in the last generation developed a variety of settings in which to evaluate the four varieties of psychic phenomena with which it is concerned.

The commonest measure of *clairvoyance* has been to ask somebody to guess which of the five symbols in a deck of twenty-five "Zener cards" someone else has turned up in another room. One would expect the normal individual to guess right about 20 percent of the time, and very often they do. But quite often somebody turns up who guesses

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more than 20 percent right. Similarly, efforts to measure *precognition* have relied on asking somebody to predict the order in which cards will turn up after they are shuffled. Despite seemingly fantastic safeguards against rational guesses, certain people seem to get more than one card in five right persistently.

Still more fantastic experiments, with *psychokinesis*, have required somebody to try to exercise his will-power over dice being rolled in a machine, making them come up, say, first sixes and then ones. Such experiments have also yielded inexplicable results. Only *telepathy* (direct communication between two minds) seems to have resisted experimental investigations. Experiments have been designed in which someone in one room thinks of a number, while the recipient of his ideas records which number it is, but the difficulty is that once the recipient has written down his guesses, a clairvoyant can cheat by claiming to have thought of the numbers he "sees" on the recipients score sheet in the next building. Needless to say, few skeptics worry much about this rather esoteric form of "cheating," but it gets some attention among parapsychologists.

What have been the results of all these experiments? No comprehensive answer is possible, for naturally those experiments which yield merely chance results are unlikely to get written up, and still less likely to get published. Some skeptics have therefore argued that if *all* the research on this subject were published, the few instances of extraordinary luck which now seem so conspicuous would pale into insignificance alongside the mass of merely random results. It would be easy to accept this view if the published results were less extraordinary, and could be expected, say, once in every thousand or ten thousand experiments. But even if every member of the human race had done nothing but roll dice and turn Zener cards since Homo sapiens came down from the trees, there would not be one chance in a million of achieving the results accumulated and published in the last generation. One is reminded of the first year physics class in which one learns that it is "possible" for all the molecules of a piano to vibrate in the same direction at once, and hence that there is no reason to presume that a piano's decision to hover around the light fixtures indicates a suspension of the law of gravity. No doubt. But were such an event to take place, say, at Mr. Kennedy's inaugural ball, serious exception might be taken in some circles to Sir Isaac's formulae.

But do we need to suspend the classical laws of perception to account for these experimental data? Not necessarily. One alternative is to claim wholesale fraud. Such an approach is lent a certain color by the fact that most of the successful experiments in this field have been written up by one person, J. B. Rhine and his colleagues at Duke, and a substantial number have also been performed under his auspices. When others have tried to duplicate his results they have often failed. But not enough of them have failed to make the fraud theory really plausible, especially as comparable results have occasionally been obtained quite independently in England and on the Continent. If this is fraud, it is the result of an international conspiracy, not a mere modification of a few manuscripts to attract a rich philanthropist or earn a promotion.

Nevertheless, the inability to specify the conditions under which psychic effects can be expected has made all of these experiments somewhat suspect, for the ability to repeat an experiment is one common test of its validity. Respected astronomers may be able to earn credence for observations that cannot be duplicated, but even they have difficulty if these observations do not fit into some plausible general theory. A more apt comparison is perhaps between psychic powers and creative powers, in that public performances and hostile observors often combine on both cases to shackle the unconscious mechanisms on which success depends. Yet even the student of creativity has an advantage over the parapsychologist, for artists working in garrets leave works which future generations can study, while clairvoyants working in seances produce claims which, even if they are verified by the five ordinary senses, are soon forgotten or written off by those who were not present.

If such exceptional events as Dr. Rhine and others record cannot be explained by deliberate fraud, it is still possible that unconscious deception may be involved. Thus there can be no doubt that some of the early experiments with clairvoyance did not entirely eliminate the possibility that the guesser was inadvertently getting subliminal cues from the man turning the cards. Checks of the records have also suggested that recorders who believe in extra-sensory perception tend to make mistakes in favor of the direction of their bias. But such experimental defects have been largely eliminated in more recent work, and in any event do not suffice to explain even the early results. Subliminal cues may explain clairvoyance, but they do not explain precognition or psychokinesis. You can't roll snake eyes subliminally. And while recording-errors are possible in precognition and psychokinesis, such errors would be expected during long boring series in which the recorder's attention wanders and unconscious bias takes over. Yet these series are the ones in which success is least common, and it is on the first and last throws of a series, when everyone's attention and interests are aroused, that the best results are almost invariably obtained.

Skeptics have raised other objections to many experiments in this field. Some parapsychologists have not taken sufficient precautions against biased dice, while others have failed to realize that shuffling a deck of cards does not necessarily produce a random distribution. But still, looking on the 30 years of experimentation as a whole, conventional explanations just will not suffice for more than a small fraction of the results. Unfortunately, there are no unconventional explanations to put in their place.

H. G. Heine's *The Vital Sense* is one of the more ingenious efforts in this field to provide a workable hypothesis for explaining the known facts. She proposes that the reticulo-endothelial system serves man as a kind of internal

Next Week

The Justice of the Means of War

by William Lee Miller

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chemical communication system, and that in this capacity it can also occasionally act as a "sixth sense" for obtaining information from the surrounding environment. It is rather as if the sense of smell were to become so useless to men that we lost our consciousness of smelling things, although retaining some physical capacity to pick up odors. Under such circumstances one can imagine the smell of, say, rotten eggs producing an unconscious physical response which might, through experience, become associated with high school chemistry laboratories. Then if, after election to the school board, one were to wander through the basement, one might meet this odor, and responding to the resultant physical stimulus, might "see" the high school chemistry teacher fiddling in his laboratory. If one then walked around the corner and discovered him actually in the lab, one would have no idea why the vision had come, and might attribute it to a mysterious clairvoyance.

If Dr. Heine offered a concrete description of the reticulo-endothelial system's equivalent to chemical odors – its vehicle for sending and transmitting the messages she describes in such vivid detail – one might almost begin to take her elaborate speculations seriously. But the vagueness of her references to "rays" and "emanations" leaves one with the impression that she may still be writing for the New Zealand students to whom she formerly lectured on economics. And even an undergraduate would be suspicious of the notion that some unspecified Buck Rogers "ray" could carry vivid pictures of, say, a man's death by drowning around the world from New Zealand to England, as Dr. Heine alleges. It may be that the macrophages in which she pins so much faith have powers that modern television lacks, but the skeptics will want at least a guess as to how this miracle is performed.

If clairvoyance were the only phenomenon to be explained, we might classify *The Vital Sense* as an intriguing if inadequate hypothesis. But one must remember, as Dr. Heine only does in her concluding chapters, that there are still precognition and psychokinesis to deal with. Dr. Heine does not take precognition seriously, however, and it is in turn difficult to accept her effort to explain psychokinesis as more than a gesture. No standard biological theory can cope with successful efforts to predict random events, such as the fall of Dr. Rhine's dice, and unless you are willing to accept divine intervention it is difficult to see how such "neo-classical" biologistic theories as Dr. Heine's will ever bear much relevance to experiments in which dice are influenced by will-power.

But if we do not accept Dr. Heine's proposals, whom are we to listen to? Critics of parapsychology rarely bother to read the full literature on the subject, and content themselves to scoring debater's points off ill-designed experiments whose shortcomings have subsequently been remedied. And advocates of parapsychology seem equally content to score debater's points against their critics, since their data do not offer any more promising lines of argument. Under such circumstances the chief value of parapsychology may after all be the light it throws on the vagaries of scientific method, and the support it lends to the view that science is fundamentally a body of dogmas, not a body of facts.

Love Under the Microscope

by Lester H. Gorn

Heroic Love
by Edward Loomis
(Knopf; $3.75)

These four novellas and a short story are grouped by background ("The West" and "The War") and linked loosely by love – of man for woman, man for man, man for nature, man for life itself. All five of Mr. Loomis' tales are in the classical tradition – serious, ordered, austere.

The title story adapts Euripedes' *Hippolytus* to a pre-depression, back-country cattle town in eastern California. At 21, Orville Ledyard is a cowboy, scholar and folk hero. He cleans up at the annual rodeo, reads Gibbon and Macaulay, performs feats of valor. Destiny beckons – until Orville and the young wife of a middle-aged lawyer fall in love. Because the lawyer is Orville's friend, tutor and father figure, he heroically resists passion and finally triumphs by recourse to "Burton's remedy" – the conquest of eleven more-or-less willing girls. What Orville finds irresistible, however, is the wife's professed hate. He yields. The husband discovers he has been cuckolded and publicly humiliates the boy.

Over the years most of us suffer small defeats that have their cumulative effect. Orville's fall from grace occurs at one blow, turning an uncommon youth towards common middle age. (Ultimately he settles into small town mediocrity.) The author asks us to lament youthful gifts dispersed and lost. That should be easy. It isn't. A minor character narrates the story in so dispassionate a manner that the reader is prompted similarly to dispassion. We virtually are screened off from involvement with the figures in the account.

"Classicism," said Andre Gide, "is the art of expressing most by saying least." Saying least, Gide might have added, risks expressing least. Even when a narrator is not interposed, Loomis' surface austerity muffles and obscures. Neither poignance nor anguish can break through the author's restraint. Motivations are muddy, like watercolors done by a child. As a consequence, Loomis seems bereft of emotional commitment to his characters, and *Heroic Love* bemuses where it should move.

That Loomis is (or was) capable of emotional commitment, there can be no doubt. *End of a War* (1958) and *The Charcoal Horse* (1959) fused emotion and technique to transcend experience. Wartime memories still are vivid. A feeling for nature endures. Loomis has an eye for physical detail and an ear for dialogue. The seen and the heard are set down simply and with grace. There is little trivia. The tales are sound structurally.

Because the author teaches English at Santa Barbara College, an impolite question intrudes. Is he another victim of Academe? For the writer the academic cloister may be entombment.

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On campus, the writer encounters some deferential time-servers (the many), some scholars (the few), a leisurely tempo. The world's din becomes remote, perhaps even distasteful. The writer's characterizations become less than whole.

Consider, for example, First Sergeant Moe Lev, a product of Chicago's dark who dominates an infantry company in training stateside. The cold brown eyes over Lev's hooked nose can turn glittering and hawklike. On one occasion a Southerner incautiously had uttered an anti-Semitic remark. Lev had swarmed over the man, breaking his nose and slicing open an eyebrow. Then he had administered first aid and gone back to his card game.

When the company goes into combat against the Germans, Lev's subordinates come to regard him as a loving father or an honored brother. Even the Southerner becomes an admirer – indeed, he and Lev are the closer for having fought each other. Finally, in the war's closing days, the Southerner is wounded mortally; not all Lev's skill and devotion can stave off death. Lev weeps. Seconds later he leads a charge and is killed.

In the Homeric sense death is appropriate for Lev. Twice he had voiced hope the war would never end. Only as a leader in conventional warfare can his prowess and temperament find full expression. Such is his legacy that an Oklahoma innocent turned soldier uses eight bullets spaced over 15 minutes to exact vengeance on a prisoner.

The Jewish superman in recent American fiction is in part a reaction against stereotypy, and Loomis very nearly brings off a Jewish Achilles whose element is war. One wonders, however, in what way Lev's Jewishness is relevant. Lev's face is a Jewish caricature, and the word "Yid" has been flung at him in anger. The story's title, "Friendship", implies war brings Lev a camaraderie his Jewishness would deny him in peacetime. Why, then, does Lev fail to react in any special way to the German enemy. The very failure of Lev to associate "German" with "Nazi" may be significant. More likely we have been given less than the whole man.

The assimilationist myth has it that the Jew is just like anybody else. Often the myth is stretched to embrace the Negro. Many liberals applaud Lorraine Hansberry's *A Raisin in the Sun* because it ostensibly portrays Negroes as just like anybody else. They aren't. The Jew isn't. Nobody is.

Whether Loomis has been stultified by creeping ivyism should become clear on publication of his next book.

Ordeal of a Southern Editor

by Paul H. Douglas

The white Southerners who disagree with the sectional code about Negroes are among the loneliest of Americans, and those who speak out against it are among the bravest. In the first rank of both the lonely and the brave is P. D. East, who publishes the *Petal Paper* in deepest Mississippi.

The Magnolia Jungle
by P. D. East
(Simon and Schuster; $3.95)

Fighting the segregationists with wry satire, he has lost every subscriber in his town of publication and nearly everyone in the surrounding area. Nevertheless in some mysterious fashion, the people know what East is saying, and while it infuriates many, it encourages others. Like Harry Golden's *Carolina Israelite* and Ronnie Duggers' *Texas Observer*, his paper has gained national circulation and exercises some local influence.

East's weapon is humor. He took on the Citizens Councils by giving free advertising to their meetings as a chance for members to become "free of social worries" and "super-superior," and by printing beside the ad a cut of a braying jackass. In the midst of a political campaign, he solemnly announced the candidacy of Cornpone P. Neanderthal, with a portrait of the candidate, apparently drawn from the pages of Henry Fairfield Osborne's *Men of the Old Stone Age*. Starting a back-fire against the violent segregationists, through Nathan Bedford Cooclose, he proposed to exclude from Southern society the Scotch-Irish, because they drank scotch instead of bourbon, ate oatmeal, danced the highland fling and sounded their "r's" in a most "un-Southern" manner.

I don't know how long P. D. East can survive, but I do know that it is extremely important that he should. What made the Civil War inevitable was the stilling of the voices of dissent in the South after 1830. Once the critics were silenced, and the South's "peculiar institution" of slavery became sanctified, events moved on inevitably to the firing on Sumter and all the tragic consequences that followed. At times it seems as though the deep South were now going the way of South Africa, and that dissenters must conform or like the Grimké sisters of pre-Civil War days move out. If this does happen, then the future of this nation will indeed be clouded. Men and women like East, therefore, deserve both our moral and financial aid. For they alone can prevent a monolithic culture from developing within the white community of the deep South which can only culminate in disaster for all concerned.

As one who believes that there is a large, latent group within the South which wants to move forward in racial and national amity (their existence was certainly evidenced in the recent political victory of Estes Kefauver), I for one wish a long life to P. D. East and his *Petal Paper*. Those who subscribe to it will get their money's worth in sardonic chuckles and off-beat humor. This is an unusual autobiography by an unusual man. I find both very appealing. And we could use some P.D.'s in the North, to take off on our own weaknesses and hypocrisies. Let us hope that his example proves contagious.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Charles Burton Marshall *is the author of* The Limits of Foreign Policy. Lester H. Gorn *is a California novelist who teaches at Monterey Peninsula College.* Paul H. Douglas *has just been re-elected US Senator from Illinois.* Alvin Charles Kibel *makes his first* New Republic *appearance with this issue.*

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Where Symbol Equals Reality

by Alvin Charles Kibel

William Blake believed that man's body in this present life was not used to its capacity, and that sensual enjoyments were, in consequence, highly limited. "If the doors of perception were cleansed," he wrote, "every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."

What was for Blake a metaphor of the fallen state becomes for the hero of Isaac Bashevis Singer's new novel a literal destiny. Yasha Mazur, the magician of Lublin, begins where Blake would have us end, with an amazing control of his body. He can perform any feat of balancing, shell peas with his toes, flex his limbs in any direction. His home is in the Polish *shtetl* of Lublin, but he lives among his people as a stranger, a lonely figure, and lacks the high spirits of shared ceremonies or the pious satisfaction of saying the Eighteen Benedictions and declaring one's guilt before God. He is drawn rather to the gentile life of Warsaw, to which he journeys for his performances – to its ease, its refinement, its lack of restrictions, its intellectual life, and its women.

The Magician of Lublin
by Isaac Bashevis Singer
(Noonday; $3.50)

And Yasha's power very nearly finds complete expression: he sees through the arguments of the Talmud, he receives offers from the opera-houses of Rome, Paris, London, he learns of a miser's safe which his nimble fingers can open, he captivates the heart of a Polish lady, the widow of a university professor. But at this moment he returns to Lublin and immures himself in a narrow brick hut with one window and no door. He has become Yasha the Penitent; for he has recognized his power as from the devil.

Readers familiar with Singer's volume of stories, *Gimpel the Fool*, will recognize in *The Magician of Lublin* a characteristic device of his fiction, the source of his ironic, often malevolent humor. I mean the lack of distance between symbol and reality. When Yasha Mazur turns a card, opens a lock, or reads a Polish book on the laws of nature, we are not presented merely with a figure of power, but with acts which themselves undermine the universal order.

But Singer does not write parables. To him evil is immeasurable. That is why his stories often convey the effect of an evil comedy; there is a ghastly incongruity between the nature of action as the characters first understand it and as it really is.

Singer does not determine the character of evil by its social consequences. His characters have little contact with each other; they are wholly concerned with the devil. The powers of darkness struggle for possession of their souls: the least slip, the merest fantasy of indulgence, and they are in the hands of the enemy. Nor does Singer permit God to take part in this eternal contest. For in the history of Western civilization the concept of God has become the great agent for *socializing* the moral struggle. He measures our sins and reminds us, by implication, that we may measure them ourselves: he turns us, in some sense, to our relations with one another for a standard of good and evil. Most important of all, by his existence we are encouraged to make personal demands upon him: he inculcates a sense of redemption. But in Singer's world there is no social conscience. Indeed, he regards the system of rationalism which would define good and evil in terms of social consequences as an indulgence of pride, part of the capitulation which the outside world has made to the powers of darkness.

To determine the nature of action for good or evil by its effect upon others, one must first develop a sense of the connection between one's actions and one's self. But what Singer hates, what he wishes us to dispense with, is the connection between personality and experience: the sense of pride at the sight of one's deeds, the moral consciousness which attends the development of a will. For the will of man is corrupt at its source. That is why Singer's characters can hardly be said to possess a will at all. They stand in dumb amazement at their actions, they are passive spectators of the strange forces which move within their bodies, they are terrified by the exercise of their will.

For action is the sign of power, and power is the sign of evil. And that is why, like the most radical Christian, Singer believes in the equation of symbol with reality, of imagination with action: the first step from God is a descent into the abyss, the first covetous glance is the rape of our neighbor's wife. For we cannot relax our guard an instant: we dare not give the monster who waits within us the least opportunity to come out. Indeed, the moral crisis of Singer's hero occurs when he realizes that acts of will are acts of the devil and not his own; and his salvation is precisely his determination to destroy the abilities for action.

The hero of the novel, as the tradition defined itself in the 19th Century, possesses a humanity yet uncompromised by society. He is the young man from the provinces, the outsider, the man whose will has not been given specific direction; he searches the moral world for opportunities to direct it. Whatever the outcome of his struggle with the paraphernalia of social life, whatever the content of the personality he ultimately develops, he wins for the rest of us a new space of action, an enlarged freedom, a greater sense of movement in the moral world. He has in some degree challenged our limitations and extended them.

But Yasha Mazur does not possess an abstract humanity. The conditions under which he has acquired the bare outline of a man are such as to compromise the exercise of his body and his mind. He is a finished creature to begin with and has no exploration to make of the social world, no business to acquire, no space to win. His determination to immure himself might have been made at any point in the novel, for all its inner development is concerned. His task is not to struggle with the character of his will but to lose all sense of relation to it; to become like Gimbel the Fool, who does not distinguish between true and false experiences, or like the pious Jews who confess by ritual the guilty nature of their blameless lives and have lost the connection between action and identity.

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MOVIES

Trip Around the World

The Sundowners (Warner)
Hell is a City (Columbia)
The Savage Innocents (Paramount)

Who remembers travelogues? The word itself is dated, recalling the sound of a gong and a nasal voice saying, "as we leave beautiful Istanbul . . ." They are practically *passé* because their function has been neatly taken over by the fictional feature film. For example, if you can manage to look past the actors and disregard the dialogue, you can get some pleasure even out of *The World of Suzie Wong* and *A Breath of Scandal* for what they show you of Hong Kong and Vienna.

Three new films go further: they have merits as films as well as fascinating settings. *The Sundowners* was made in Australia, in the sheep country, and it brings to life both the social world of its characters and their physical world. It is one of those rare pictures, full of untidinesses, obviously scissored and imperfect, whose vitality is so infectious that you are happy to forgive the flaws. In its most simple-minded form, the reaction might be stated as having met some interesting people and being sorry to leave them.

Robert Mitchum and Deborah Kerr are migrant workers who have lived in a wagon since they were married, following temporary jobs on sheep stations. Now that their son is approaching maturity, the conflict between them – the nomadic versus the settled life – is heightened. The resolution of this conflict, exacerbated by their love of each other and their familiarity with each other's faults and fineness, is the subject of the story. And while it is being told, the way of the Australian sheepman and his country are splashed before you – complete with kangaroos, koalas, and deer, with lush vistas, with ugly clapboard towns, and with beer, beer, beer.

Mitchum – thanks, probably, to Fred Zinnemann's direction – gives an affecting performance as the big Irish-Australian whose joints are beginning to creak a little and who is therefore a bit more attentive to his wife's arguments. Miss Kerr is lovely – battered, worn, strong: a good actress continuing to enrich her ability to make life. Peter Ustinov, however, is miscast as a cashiered ship's-captain turned philosophical. You can actually see him trying to bend this character into the shape of the one he usually plays.

Zinnemann has presumably expended more time on his actors than on his camera work and editing. The photography is not as impressive as in *The Nun's Story;* there are loose ends and jerky sequences. The film lacks polish, but he has sympathized with his material and he succeeds in making you share his sympathy.

A much less original idea is the "exploitation" of a city in a thriller. London, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco are some that have been toured while private and public eyes did their duty. *Hell is a City* is noteworthy for two reasons: first, it is a very good thriller; second, it anatomizes a city which you wouldn't have expected to be chosen and which, at least once, is interesting – Manchester (England). Stanley Baker, recently a Welsh Scotland-Yard man in *Chance Meeting,* is here sturdy and grim as a Mancusian detective who has to re-capture an escaped convict whom he jailed once and who has committed murder after his escape. By means of Val Guest's headlong direction and Arthur Grant's excellent photography, the city and its environs are unpeeled for you. The script is marred by a marital problem assigned to Baker (it is now the fashion to "humanize" the detective); otherwise

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it is a seat-edge whizzer, with a vitriolic performance by John Crawford as the criminal. And Manchester can never again be merely a name to you.

The Savage Innocents is an Eskimo story and is blighted by more obvious studio shots than either of the above; still it contains a great deal of stunning Arctic color photography and a re-creation of Eskimo life that is (plot to one side) absorbing. Most of the little I know on this subject comes from Flaherty's *Nanook of the North* and Hans Ruesch's novel *Top of the World.* The latter is the basis of this film – miles away from Flaherty in quality and purity but worth seeing. Anthony Quinn in the leading role has wrought an inner consistency in the near-brute that is convincing and impressive; so is the fight for survival where survival seems impossible. In fact, the Arctic is made so real that you find yourself asking why people have insisted on living there through the centuries.

Once, driving in the country near Rome, I passed a sign-post reading "San Pietro di Roma – Il Paese di *Pane, Amore e Fantasie.*" (The Village of *Bread, Love and Dreams.*) I turned off, and there was the hilltop village I already knew so well. If location shooting continues at this pace, all travel may become one long sensation of *déjà vu.* More than one essay could be devoted to the metaphysical and psychological aspects of arriving in a place where one has never been but which one knows. It is quite different from having read about it, in fact or fiction, different from having seen photographs. You have been through experience, seen and felt, in the place before you came. The effect is both unsettling and pleasant.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

"IT IS A PITY *that Professor Mills, who won disciples to some of the daring and preceptive theories of his earlier books* (e.g., The New Man of Power, White Collar, The Power Elite) *should be exercising an influence he earned during more responsible moments, to lead his followers into a policy of No-think on the subject of Castro's Cuba. The Fair Play for Cuba Committee, of which he is the principal energumen, is this season's re-enactment of the ad hoc committee defending the Moscow trials in the late thirties.*"

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. R-6, 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N.Y., for free copy.

Correspondence

Eisenhower The What?

Sirs:

The article by Joseph C. Harsch, "Eisenhower The Good" (December 12), is rather bewildering, in view of the assumption in his opening paragraph that choice of descriptive adjectives is manifold. Why then does he limit himself to two: the Great or the Good? With an impulse toward the Flaubertian *mot juste,* we might say "Eisenhower the Inept," or "Eisenhower the Mediocre" or "Eisenhower the Miscast."

"There are three flaws in Eisenhower's title to greatness which future historians are more likely to notice than his contemporaries," writes Mr. Harsch. There are many aspects of his popularity that are going to interest not only future historians but future psychologists as well, considerably more than they do his contemporaries.

A pleasant grin, a difficulty in formulating a straight sentence, a tendency to duck out from under responsibility and to shift it to others, a confused idea that the role of United States President is akin to that of a reigning monarch – why these qualities should have fired the popular imagination as they have done, is an interesting question for the psychologists.

Berenice Noar
New York, N. Y.

"Cuba Sí, Yanqui No"

Sirs:

May I come in support of Professor Samuel Shapiro's conclusion (December 5) that George Sherman does not speak Spanish. Furthermore, he had never been in a Latin American country before he came to report on Cuba (October 24) and he did not have the slightest information on Latin American history. At least, that is what he told me. "I have to start from scratch," were his own words.

I saw Mr. Sherman three or four times. I tried very hard to convince him that all his previous notions about "freedom" and "democracy" simply lost their meaning in countries where the yearly per capita income may be as low as $30 a year, such as Haiti or Bolivia. He seemed quite unable to understand, or even to believe, that millions in Latin America are not "free" to eat one regular meal every day or send their children to school, even if they are free to "elect" a President every four or six years.

Mr. Sherman also had a very peculiar idea of the meaning of "class struggle." Unrest among the landlords or scuffles before a church, such as now take place in Cuba, were to him evident signs of a class struggle which he blamed on the Revolution. But when I asked him, did he believe Latin American children who die of hunger or curable diseases were the victims of some kind of "class struggle," he merely smiled.

What troubled me most was the evident fact that Mr. Sherman was sincere in his views. What he had not seen, he could not believe in. My words sounded like Red Propaganda to him.

Now it is quite true, as Professor Shapiro says, that "Latin American intellectuals are not particularly frightened by the specter of Communism." Even if they enjoy the freedom to write their books, paint their pictures, or teach at their Universities – which is not always the case – sooner or later they must stop, look at their people and see that they are suffering the most elemental forms of pain and humiliation. And this pain does not come from Communism. Apparently, it comes from what is most opposed to Communism. So, you see, we suddenly leap from doubt to certainty: Communism may be, or may not be, an enemy, but it is certainly not our present enemy.

When hundreds of Indian families are driven out of the land they have held for centuries in Peru, it is not the Communists who drive them out – but it might be the Toquepala, which is an American company. When workers strike in Central America, it is not the Communists who use the Army or the police to break the strike – but it might be the United Fruit Company.

And so, all of a sudden, you have thousands of Latin Americans crying "Cuba sí, yanqui no." Can you understand it? I can. But Mr. Sherman doesn't. Perhaps he should approach this unpleasant scenery in a more humble spirit, and start by learning our language?

Rodolfo J. Walsh
Havana, Cuba

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